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ARTICLES

FOREWORD
LESLIE ANN REISt

"It's not the voting that's democracy, it's the counting."'
And, it's the counting, more precisely, the technology used to cast
and count votes that has become the focus of noisy national debate. In
2000, much of the controversy surrounding the presidential election, including the contentious and chaotic ballot recall in Florida, centered on

the use of punch card voting technology - a technology that had been in
use since the 1960's.
In an effort to prevent the same problems that sent the 2000 presidential election to the Supreme Court, technological and legislative solutions were suggested. Congress passed the Help America Vote Act
("HAVA") in October 2002.2 HAVA was intended to improve the adminis-

tration of state and federal elections through three primary vehicles.
First, HAVA "establish[ed] a program to provide funds to States to replace punch card voting systems."3 Second, it created a new federal
agency "to assist in the administration of Federal elections and to otherwise provide assistance with the administration of certain Federal election laws and programs." 4 Finally, HAVA mandated that "minimum
election administration standards" 5 be developed for states and local
governments having responsibility for administering federal elections.
Since the 2000 presidential election debacle, prompted in part by
HAVA, we have seen the development of voting technologies that provide
the promise of solutions - the end to hanging chads and misplaced paper
t Director and Adj. Professor of Law, Center for Information Technology and Privacy
Law, The John Marshall Law School; Faculty Editor, The John Marshall Journalof Computer and Information Law.
1. Quote Details, Tom Stoppard: Jumpers Act 1 (1972), http://www.quotationspage.
com/quotel 23659.html (accessed Dec. 2, 2005).
2. Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002).
3. Id. at preamble.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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ballots, along with the assurance of verified voting and easy methods of
recount. Moreover, as the 2006 deadline for meeting HAVA's requirements for replacing outdated voting systems approaches, we have also
seen a rush by states, counties and local governments to implement
these technologies. 6 There are two common types of electronic voting
systems: optical scan systems that use an electronic reader to record
votes and direct recording electronic systems ("DRE") that include the
hardware and software used to generate ballots, cast and count votes,
and sometimes maintain audit information. 7 Simply, DRE systems allow voters to cast their choices directly on an electronic ballot rather
than on a paper one.
There are many advantages to electronic voting systems. Efficiency
and accuracy are perhaps the most obvious. By automating the election
process, human error that may be injected into the process by voters and
election workers, is reduced. Moreover, electronic voting systems are
adaptable and can be programmed to allow for ballots in multiple lan8
guages or accommodations for voters with disabilities.
But, electronic voting is not a panacea. Critics claim that the technologies employed have inherent security problems, that there are flaws
in system security, access and physical hardware controls that could permit the machines to be hacked, thus opening the possibility of widespread electoral fraud. 9 In addition, transparency and accountability issues exist with the actual working of the machines. Voting machine
software is proprietary and manufacturers have fought, albeit unsuccessfully, to keep their computer codes secret. 10 Moreover, some opponents claim that because a number of systems do not require paper-backup records or other means of verification, there is no way to assess the
accuracy or integrity of the electronic voting machines or election
results."
In the 2004 presidential election, more than 40 million voters cast
their votes on approximately 175,000 recently installed electronic voting
6. Mark L. Songini, E-voting Grows Without Consensus, Computerworld (Oct. 31,
2005) http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,105802,00.html
(accessed Dec. 2, 2005).
7. Government Accountability Office, Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are Underway, But Key Activities Need to be Completed,
at 7 GAO-05-956 (Sept. 2005) [hereinafter "GAO Report'.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 22.
10. Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (D. Cal. 2004).
11. See generally Verified Voting Foundation, VerifiedVoting.org Index, http://
www.verifiedvoting.org (accessed Dec. 2, 2005); Black Box Voting, A Diebold InvestorAsks
a Question, http://www.blackboxvoting.com (accessed Dec. 2, 2005).
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machines. 12 While most of the machines functioned correctly, a number
of problems were reported. Some of the most serious problems involved
flaws in equipment design and security programming, including the lack
of encryption for cast ballots and audit logs allowing for possible undetected alteration and faulty security protection for ballot files that determine how the ballot will look and work. These faults potentially allow a
vote cast for one candidate to be recorded as a vote cast for another. 13
In one county in Florida, electronic voting machines failed to activate correctly, causing extensive delays in the opening of polling places.
In another instance in the same county, electronic voting machines malfunctioned and recorded approximately 3,900 votes too many for one of
14
the presidential candidates.
A county in Pennsylvania made a ballot error on an electronic voting
The
system that resulted in many votes not being correctly counted.
15
county's undervote percentage reached 80% in some precincts.
Electronic voting machines in North Carolina lost more than 4,000
votes when they continued to accept votes after the machines' memories
16
were full.

In spite of the reported glitches with electronic voting technology,
the use of such technology during the 2004 election was largely successful. As a consequence, manufacturers of electronic voting machines have
declared victory for the technology. 17 However, even though the
problems that emerged during the 2004 presidential election did not affect the outcome of that election, trouble continues to plague state elections this year.
A city in Ohio contested the results of the recent election, claiming
that the results of a fire levy referendum was invalid because it could not
be determined whether voters received the correct ballot on the newly
installed electronic voting machines.' 8
Plans to use newly acquired electronic voting machines for the November 2005 municipal elections in a New Mexico city were scrapped
when it was discovered that the software programmed into the machines
12. Caron Carlson, E-voting Returns Mixed Results; Disruptions Point to Unresolved
Problems, eWeek 1 (Nov. 8, 2004).
13. GAO Report, supra n. 7, at 2.
14. Id. at 31.
15. Id. at 29-30.
16. Id. at 31.
17. See Dan Verton and Patrick Thibodeau, Electronic Voting Systems Pass Their Big
Test - Maybe, Computerworld 1 (Nov. 8, 2004); Caron Carlson, E-voting Returns Mixed

Results; Disruptions Point to Unresolved Problems, eWeek 1 (Nov. 8, 2004).
18. Bob Fitrakis and Harvey Wasserman, Ohio's Diebold Debacle: New Machines Call
Election Results into Question, The Free Press (Nov. 24, 2005) http://www.freepress.org/
departments/display/ 19/2005/1593 (accessed Dec. 2, 2005).
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contained incorrect information. 19
In two Ohio counties, electronic vote totals were so delayed that re20
sults could not be posted until the morning after the election.
Technical problems with electronic voting machines that may have
affected the outcome of local elections were reported by voters in Virginia
21
and Pennsylvania.
In October 2005, the Government Accountability Office ("GAO") released a comprehensive report analyzing the issues raised by the increasing use of electronic voting systems. 2 2 The report states that
"significant concerns about the security and reliability of electronic voting systems" 23 have been raised and that "some of these concerns have
been realized and have caused problems with recent elections, resulting
in the loss and miscount of votes." 24 Further, the GAO identified a number of specific problems with security and reliability of electronic voting
systems. These problems include: weak system security controls, design
flaws in audit trail systems, incorrect system configuration, vague and
incomplete security provisions, inadequate security testing, lack of
transparency in the testing process, inadequate requirements for vendor
documentation, poor implementation of security procedures, weak security management practices and system failures during elections. 2 5
The GAO found that there is still much work to be done to improve
electronic voting systems and continued government efforts are necessary. The GAO noted that "there is a lack of consensus among election
officials, computer security experts, and others on the pervasiveness of
these concerns." 26 But, it concluded that the problems and concerns
"merit the focused attention of federal, state and local authorities re27
sponsible for election administration."
In addition to the concerns raised by the GAO report, we continue to
see problems, controversies and legal challenges involving many aspects
of electronic voting technologies. As this issue of the John Marshall
Journalof Computer and Information Law goes to press, controversies
involving security provisions, verification systems and state certification
19. Steve Ramirez, Glitch Found in New Voting Machines, Las Cruces Sun-News 1
(Oct. 29, 2005).
20. Peter Bronson, How Your Ballot Dodged Many a Bullet Amid Election Night
Chaos, The Cincinnati Enquirer, 13C (Nov. 17, 2005).
21. See Cody Lowe, Election Questions Turn Touchy, The Roanoke Times Al (Nov. 29,
2005); Tom Coombe, Recount Ordered in Upper Mount Bethel, Morning Call B9 (Dec. 3,

2005).
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

GAO Report, supra n. 7.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 23.
Id.
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of electronic voting machines are making headlines. 28 Of note is the
highly contentious legal battle involving the certification of electronic
voting machines in North Carolina - a case the Journalwill be following
29
in future issues.
It is clear that there are many interests at stake; politicians, federal,
state and local governments, the commercial technology industry and of
course the voting public all have a stake in the outcome of the issues
arising from the increasing use of electronic voting technologies. The
challenge remains to find a balance between election integrity, accountability, transparency, voter privacy and the intellectual property rights of
inventors and manufacturers of electronic voting equipment. Obviously,
electronic voting is, and will continue to be, a hot topic.
To help practitioners, election officials and the public understand
the underlying legal, technical and policy issues surrounding the use of
electronic voting in the 2004 general election and beyond, the Center for
Information Technology and Privacy Law at The John Marshall Law
School conducted a day-long symposium entitled "E-lection 2004: Is evoting ready for prime time?" The symposium brought together many of
the top technical, legal and academic minds who were at the forefront of
the new voting technology to discuss, debate and speculate on the future
of electronic voting in the United States.
The Journal recognizes that this topic is of major importance and
will continue to influence information law and policy in the United
States for years to come. We believe that government, academia and the
information technology and computer security industries must work together to design a framework for resolving these issues while balancing
the interests of all concerned. Thus, we proudly present in this issue
presentations and papers from several of the symposium participants,
including an overview of the importance of the voting process as a means
to transfer power that was presented by Richard C. Balough, the Associate Director of the Center for Information Technology and Privacy Law;
a hands-on description of what occurred in Florida after the 2000 Presidential election and how Florida changed its laws to prevent a recurrence, by Lida Rodriguez-Taseff, Counsel and Chair of the Miami-Dade
Election Reform Coalition; an analysis of what went wrong with electronic voting in two 2004 North Carolina state races written by Lillie
Coney, a senior policy analyst for the Electronic Privacy Information
28. See e.g. Voting Machines and Instant Runoffs, N.Y. Times 14LI 23 (Dec. 4, 2005)
(discussing certification and verification); On Voting Machines, The Sacramento Bee (Dec.
1, 2005) (addressing security and certification issues); William Presecky, Kane Launches
Electronic, Early Voting Initiatives, Chicago Tribune W4 (Nov. 30, 2005) (examining impementation and certification concerns).
29. Diebold Election Systems, Inc. v. The North CarolinaBoard of Elections, et al., 05
CVS 15474 (Super. Ct. Div., N.C. 2005).
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Center; an examination of the intersection between copyright, security
30
and free speech in the recently decided Online Policy Group v. Diebold
case by Doris Estelle Long, Chair of the John Marshall Law School's
Intellectual Property and Information Technology and Privacy Group;
and a wrap-up of the 2004 election and why it exceeded the margin of
litigation written by Doug Chapin, the head of electiononline.org, a nonpartisan organization dedicated to providing up to date information on
electronic voting.
Also included in this issue are the winning briefs and bench memorandum from the 23rd annual John Marshall International Moot Court
Competition in Information Technology and Privacy Law. Each year, the
competition attracts teams from all over the world who brief and argue
cutting-edge legal issues in information technology and privacy law that
are interwoven in a contemporary factual setting. This year, the problem involved technologies affecting the privacy rights of a political candidate. The problem and bench memorandum were created by a group of
John Marshall students, led by Patricia Gerdes. Ms. Gerdes unexpectedly passed away in early 2005. The Journal joins the entire JMLS
family in mourning her untimely passing. Ms. Gerdes was a Journal
candidate, an exceptional student and research assistant. Her passion,
energy and contributions to the Journal and the law school as a whole
will not be forgotten. She is deeply missed.
We dedicate this issue of the John Marshall Journal of Computer
and Information Law to the memory of Patricia Gerdes.
30. Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (D. Cal. 2004).

